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FOUR-GENERATED DIRECT POWERS OF PARTITION
LATTICES AND AUTHENTICATION
GA´BOR CZE´DLI
Dedicated to professor La´szlo´ Za´dori on his sixtieth birthday
Abstract. For an integer n ≥ 5, let Part(n) denote the lattice of all partitions
of the n-element set {1, 2, . . . , n}. This lattice, called a partition lattice or,
alternatively, an equivalence lattice, was proved to be four-generated by H.
Strietz in 1975 and by L. Za´dori in 1986. It is L. Za´dori’s particularly elegant
construction that we develop further to prove that even the k-th direct power
Part(n)k of Part(n) is four-generated if the exponent k is “not too large”.
While a trivial argument shows that this direct power cannot be four-generated
for very large exponents k, we prove that, for example, Part(100)k is four-
generated for every exponent k ≤ 3 · 1089. Also, we prove that Part(n)k
is generated by a four element subset that is not an antichain but here k
is smaller; it is at most about 1.45 · 1034 for n = 100. Last but not least,
in connection with the fact that finite partitions lattices and some of their
direct powers are complicated lattices generated by only four elements, we
outline a protocol how to use these lattices in authentication and secret key
cryptography.
1. Introduction
This paper is dedicated to La´szlo´ Za´dori not only because of his birthday, but
also because a construction from his very first mathematical paper is heavily used
here. Our starting point is that Strietz [16, 17] proved in 1975 that
the lattice Part(n) of all partitions of the (finite)
set {1, 2, . . . , n} is a four-generated lattice.
}
(1.1)
A decade later, Za´dori [19] gave a very elegant proof of this result (and proved even
more, which is not used in the present paper). Za´dori’s construction has opened
lots of perspectives; this is witnessed by Chajda and Cze´dli [3], Cze´dli [4, 5, 6, 7],
Cze´dli and Kulin [8], Kulin [12], and Taka´ch [18].
Our goal is to generalize (1.1) from partition lattices to their direct powers; see
Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 later. Passing from Part(n) to Part(n)k has some content
because of four reasons, which will be given with more details later; here we only
mention these reasons tangentially. First, even the direct square of a four-generated
lattice need not be four-generated. Second, if some direct power of a lattice is four-
generated, then so is the original lattice; see Corollaries 3.2 and 4.2. Third, for each
non-singleton finite lattice L, there is a (large) positive integer k = k(L) such that
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2 G. CZE´DLI
the direct power Lk is not four-generated; this explains that the exponent is not
arbitrary in our theorems. We admit that we could not find all possible exponents;
this task will probably remain unsolved for long. Fourth, a whole section of this
paper is devoted to the applicability of complicated lattices with few generators in
Information Theory.
Although this paper has some links to Information Theory, it is primarily a
lattice theoretical paper. Note that only some elementary facts, regularly taught
in graduate (and often in undergraduate) algebra, are needed about lattices. For
those who know how to compute the join of two equivalence relations the paper is
probably self-contained. If not, then a small part of each of the monographs Burris
and Sankappanavar [1], Gra¨tzer [10, 11], and Nation [13] can be recommended; note
that [1] and [13] are freely downloadable at the time of writing.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the rudi-
ments of partition lattices and recalls Za´dori’s construction in details; these details
will be used in the subsequent two sections. Section 3 formulates and prove our first
result, Theorem 3.1, asserting that Part(n)k is four-generated for certain values of
k. In Section 4, we formulate and prove Theorem 4.1 about the existence of a four-
element generating set of order type 1 + 1 + 2 in Part(n)k. Finally, Section 5 offers
a protocol for authentication based on partition lattices and their direct powers;
this protocol can also be used in secret key cryptography.
2. Rudiments and Za´dori’s construction
For a set A, a set of pairwise disjoint nonempty subsets of A is a partition of A
if the union of these subsets, called blocks, is A. For example,
U = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5}} (2.1)
is a partition of A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For pairwise distinct elements a1, . . . , ak of
A, the partition of A with block {a1, . . . , ak} such that all the other blocks are
singletons will be denoted by [[a1, . . . ak ]]
e. Then, in our notation, U from (2.1) is
the same as
[[1, 3]]e + [[2, 4]]e. (2.2)
For partitions U and V of A, we say that U ≤ V if and only if every block of U is
as subset of a (unique) block of V . With this ordering, the set of all partitions of
A turns into a lattice, which we denote by Part(A). For brevity,
Part(n) will stand for Part({1, 2, . . . , n}), (2.3)
and also for Part(A) when A is a given set consisting of n elements. Associated
with a partition U of A, we define an equivalence relation piU of A as the collection
of all pairs (x, y) ∈ A2 such that x and y belong to the same block of U . As it is well
known, the equivalence relations and the partitions of A mutually determine each
other, and piU ≤ piV if and only if U ≤ V . Hence, the lattice Equ(A) of all equiva-
lence relations of A (in short, the equivalence lattice of A) is isomorphic to Part(A).
In what follows, we do not make a sharp distinction between a partition and the
corresponding equivalence relation; no matter which of them is given, we can use
the other one without warning. For example, (2.2) also denotes an equivalence rela-
tion associated with the partition given in (2.1), provided the base set {1, 2, . . . , 5}
is understood. So we define and denote equivalences as the partitions above but we
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prefer to work in Equ(A) and Equ(n) = Equ({1, . . . , n}), because the lattice oper-
ations are easier to handle in Equ(A). For κ, λ ∈ Equ(A), the meet and the join of
κ and λ, denoted by κλ (or κ · λ) and κ+ λ, are the intersection and the transitive
hull of the union of κ and λ, respectively. The advantage of this notation is that
the usual precedence rule allows us to write, say, xy+xz instead of (x∧y)∨ (x∧z).
Lattice terms are composed from variables and join and meet operation signs in the
usual way; for example, f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (x1 + x2)(x3 + x4) + (x1 + x3)(x2 + x4)
is a quaternary lattice term. Given a lattice L and a1, . . . , ak ∈ L, the sublattice
generated by {a1, . . . , ak} is denoted and defined by
[a1, . . . , ak]lat := {f(a1, . . . , ak) : a1, . . . , ak ∈ L, f is a lattice term}. (2.4)
If there are pairwise distinct elements a1, . . . , ak ∈ L such that [a1, . . . , ak]lat = L
then L is said to be a k-generated lattice.
Almost exclusively, we are going to define our equivalence relations by (undi-
rected simple, edge-coloured) graphs. Every horizontal thin straight edge is α-
colored, but this is not always indicated in the figures. The thin straight edges of
slope 1, that is the southwest-northeast edges, are β-colored while the thin straight
edges with slope −1, that is the southeast-northwest edges, are γ-colored. Finally,
the thin solid curved edges are δ-colored. (We should disregard the dashed ovals at
this moment. Note that except for Figure 4, every edge is thin.) Figure 1 helps to
keep this convention in mind. On the vertex set A, this figure and the other figures
in the paper define an equivalence (relation) α ∈ Equ(A) in the following way:
deleting all edges but the α-colored ones, the components of the remaining graph
are the blocks of the partition associated with α. In other words, 〈x, y〉 ∈ α if and
only if there is an α-coloured path from vertex x to vertex y in the graph, that is,
a path (of possibly zero length) all of whose edges are α-colored. The equivalences
β, γ, and δ are defined analogously. The success of Za´dori’s construction, to be
discussed soon, lies in the fact of this visualization. Note that, to make our figures
less crowded, the labels α, . . . , δ are not always indicated but
our convention, shown in Figure 1, defines the colour of the edges (2.5)
even in this case.
Figure 1. Standard notation for this paper
Let us agree upon the following notation:∑
for all meaningful x
[[ux, vx ]]
e will be denoted by any of
[[ux, vx ]]
e
∀, [[uy, vy ]]
e
∀, and [[uz, vz ]]
e
∀;
 (2.6)
that is, each of x, y and z in subscript or superscript position will mean that a join
is formed for all meaningful values of these subscripts or superscript. If only a part
of the meaningful subscripts or superscripts are needed in a join, then the following
notational convention will be in effect:
[[〈u(i), v(i)〉 : i ∈ I ]]e stands for
∑
i∈I
[[u(x), v(x) ]]e. (2.7)
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For an integer k ≥ 2 and the (2k + 1)-element set
Z = Z(2k + 1) := {a0, a1, . . . , ak, b0, b1, . . . , bk−1},
we define
α := [[a0, a1, . . . ak ]]
e + [[b0, b1, . . . bk−1 ]]e = [[ax, ax+1 ]]e + [[by, by+1 ]]e
β := [[ax, bx ]]
e
∀ = [[〈ai, bi〉 : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1]]e,
γ := [[ax+1, bx ]]
e
∀ = [[〈ai+1, bi〉 : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1]]e,
δ := [[a0, b0 ]]
e + [[ak, bk−1 ]]e;
(2.8)
see Figure 2. Then the system 〈Z(2k + 1);α, β, γ, δ〉 is called a (2k + 1)-element
Za´dori configuration. Its importance is revealed by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (Za´dori [19]). For k ≥ 2, [α, β, γ, δ]lat = Equ(Z(2k + 1)), that is, the
four partitions the Za´dori configuration generate the lattice of all equivalences of
Z(2k + 1). Consequently,
[α, β, γ, [[a0, b0 ]]
e, [[ak, bk−1 ]]e]lat = Equ(Z(2k + 1)). (2.9)
Figure 2. The Za´dori configuration of odd size 2k + 1 with k = 6
We shall soon outline the proof of this lemma since we are going to use its details
in the paper. But firstly, we formulate another lemma from Za´dori [19] that has
been used also in Cze´dli [4, 6, 4] and in other papers like Kulin [12]. We are going
to recall its proof only for later reference.
Lemma 2.2 (“Circle Principle”). If d0, d1, . . . , dn−1 is a repetition-free enumera-
tion of an n-element finite set A and n ≥ 3, then Equ(A) is generated by
{[[dn−1, d0 ]]e} ∪
⋃
0≤i≤n−2
{[[di, di + 1]]e}.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The lemma follows from the easy fact that for any two sub-
scripts u and v with 0 ≤ u < v ≤ n− 1,
[[du, dv ]]
e =
(
[[du, du+1 ]]
e + [[du+1, du+2 ]]
e · · ·+ [[dv−1, dv ]]e
) · ([[dv, dv+1 ]]e
+ · · ·+ [[dn−2, dn−1 ]]e + [[dn−1, d0 ]]e + [[d0, d1 ]]e + · · ·+ [[du−1, du ]]e
)
.
}
(2.10)

Proof of Lemma 2.1. On the set {α, β, γ, δ} of variables, we are going to define
several quaternary terms recursively. But first of all, we define the quadruple
µ := 〈α, β, γ, δ〉 (2.11)
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of four variables with the purpose of abbreviating our quaternary terms t(α, β, γ, δ)
by t(µ). We let
g0(µ) := βδ (i.e. = β ∧ δ),
hi+1(µ) := ((gi(µ) + γ)α+ gi(µ))γ for i ≥ 0,
gi+1(µ) := ((hi+1(µ) + β)α+ hi+1(µ))β for i ≥ 0,
H0(µ) := γδ,
Gi+1(µ) := ((Hi(µ) + β)α+Hi(µ))β for i ≥ 0,
Hi+1(µ) := ((Gi+1(µ) + γ)α+Gi+1(µ))γ for i ≥ 0.

(2.12)
For later reference, let us point out that
In (2.12), δ is used only twice: to
define g0(µ) and to define H0(µ).
}
(2.13)
Next, in harmony with (2.8) and Figure 2, we let
µ := 〈α, β, γ, δ〉. (2.14)
Clearly,
βδ = [[a0, b0 ]]
e and γδ = [[ak, bk−1 ]]e. (2.15)
An easy induction shows that
gi(µ) := [[〈aj , bj〉 : 0 ≤ j ≤ i]]e for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
hi(µ) := [[〈aj , bj−1〉 : 1 ≤ j ≤ i]]e for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Hi(µ) := [[〈ak−j , bk−1−j〉 : 0 ≤ j ≤ i]]e for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
Gi(µ) := [[〈ak−j , bk−j〉 : 1 ≤ j ≤ i]]e for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
 (2.16)
Next, for certain edges 〈u, v〉 of the graph given in Figure 2, we define a correspond-
ing lattice term eu,v(µ) as follows.
eai,bi(µ) := gi(µ) ·Gk−i(µ), for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
eai,bi−1(µ) := hi(µ) ·Hk−i(µ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
eai,ai+1(µ) := α · (eai,bi(µ) + eai+1,bi(µ)), for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
ebi,bi+1(µ) := α · (eai+1,bi(µ) + eai+1,bi+1(µ)), 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2.
 (2.17)
The first two equalities below follow from (2.16), while the third and the fourth
from the first two.
eai,bi(µ) = [[ai, bi ]]
e, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
eai,bi−1(µ) = [[ai, bi−1 ]]
e for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
eai,ai+1(µ) = [[ai, ai+1 ]]
e for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
ebi,bi+1(µ) = [[bi, bi+1 ]]
e, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2.
 (2.18)
Finally, let
〈d0, d1, . . . , dn−1〉 := 〈a0, a1, . . . , ak, bk−1, bk−2, . . . , b0〉. (2.19)
In harmony with (2.10), we define the following term
edu,dv (µ) :=
(
edu,du+1(µ) + edu+1,du+2(µ) · · ·+ edv−1,dv (µ)
) · (edv,dv+1(µ)
+ · · ·+ edn−2,dn−1(µ) + edn−1,d0 + ed0,d1(µ) + · · ·+ edu−1,du(µ)
)
.
}
(2.20)
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for 0 ≤ u < v ≤ 2k + 1. Combining (2.10), (2.18), and (2.20), we obtain that
edu,dv (µ) = [[du, dv ]]
e. (2.21)
Based on (2.13), note at this point that in (2.12), (2.17), and (2.20), δ is used only
twice: to define g0(µ) and to define H0(µ). Consequently, taking (2.15) also into
account, we conclude that
equality (2.21) remains valid if δ, the fourth component of
µ, is replaced by any other partition whose meet with β
and that with γ are [[a0, b0 ]]
e and [[ak, bk−1 ]]e, respectively.
 (2.22)
Since every atom of Equ(Z(2k + 1)) is of the form (2.21) and Equ(Z(2k + 1)) is
an atomistic lattice, [α, β, γ, δ]lat = Equ(Z(n)). In virtue of (2.22) and since δ has
been used only twice, (2.9) also holds, completing the proof of Lemma 2.1. 
Figure 3. A configuration for even size 2k + 2 with k = 3
Next, for k ≥ 2, we add a new vertex c, a β-colored edge 〈b0, c〉, and a γ-colored
edge 〈b2, c〉 to Z(2k + 1) to obtain Z(2k + 2), see Figure 3. This configuration is
different from what Za´dori [19] used for the even case; our approach by Figure 3 is
simpler and fits better to our purposes. Again, the dashed curved edges of Figure 3
should be disregarded until otherwise is stated.
Lemma 2.3. For n = 2k + 2 ≥ 6, we have that Equ(Z(n)) = [α, β, γ, δ]lat.
Proof. With the short terms α∗ = α, β
∗
:= β(α+δ), γ∗ := γ(α+δ), and δ
∗
:= δ, we
define µ∗ := 〈α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗〉. For each term t defined in (2.12) and (2.17), we define
a term t∗ as t∗(µ) := t(µ∗). We also need the corresponding partitions α∗ := α,
β∗ := β(α + δ), γ∗ := γ(α + δ), δ∗ := δ, and the quadruple µ∗ := 〈α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗〉.
Apart from the singleton block {c}, they are the same as the partitions considered
in Lemma 2.1 for Z(2k + 1). Hence, it follows that (2.16), (2.18), and (2.21) hold
with µ∗ instead of µ. In other words, they hold with µ if the terms t are replaced
by the corresponding terms t∗. In particular, (2.21) is reworded as follows:
e∗x,y(µ) = [[x, y ]]
e for all x, y ∈ Z(n) \ {c}. (2.23)
So if we define (without defining their “ ∗-free versions” ea0,c and ea2,c) the terms
e∗a0,c(µ) := β ·
(
γ + ea0,a2(µ
∗)
)
and e∗a2,c(µ) := γ ·
(
β + ea0,a2(µ
∗)
)
, (2.24)
then it follows easily that
e∗a0,c(µ) = [[a0, c]]
e and e∗a2,c(µ) = [[a2, c]]
e; (2.25)
remark that in addition to (2.23), (2.25) also belongs to the scope of (2.22). Let
〈d0, d1, . . . , dn−1〉 := 〈a0, c, a2, a3, . . . , ak, bk−1, bk−2, . . . , b1, a1, b0〉. (2.26)
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Similarly to (2.20) but now based on (2.26) rather than (2.19), we define the fol-
lowing term (without defining its “non-asterisked” fdu,dv version)
f∗du,dv (µ) :=
(
e∗du,du+1(µ) + e
∗
du+1,du+2(µ) · · ·+ e∗dv−1,dv (µ)
) · (e∗dv,dv+1(µ)
+ · · ·+ e∗dn−2,dn−1(µ) + edn−1,d0 + e∗d0,d1(µ) + · · ·+ e∗du−1,du(µ)
)} (2.27)
for 0 ≤ u < v ≤ n. By Lemma 2.2, (2.23), (2.25), and (2.27), we obtain that
f∗x,y(µ) = [[x, y ]]
e for all x 6= y ∈ Z(n). (2.28)
The remark right after (2.25) allows us to note that
(2.28) also belongs to the scope of (2.22). (2.29)
Finally, Lemma 2.2 and (2.28) imply Lemma 2.3. 
3. Generating direct powers of partition lattices
Before formulating the main result of the paper, we recall some notations and
concepts. The lower integer part of a real number x will be denoted by bxc; for
example, b√2c = 1 and b2c = 2. The set of positive integer numbers will be denoted
by N+. For n ∈ N+, the number of partitions of the n-element set {1, 2, . . . , n},
that is, the size of Part(n) ∼= Equ(n) is the so-called n-th Bell number ; it will be
denoted by Bell(n). The number of partitions of n objects with exactly r blocks is
denoted by S(n, r); it is the Stirling number of the second kind with parameters n
and r. Note that S(n, r) ≥ 1 if and only if 1 ≤ r ≤ n; otherwise S(n, r) is zero.
Clearly, Bell(n) = S(n, 1) + S(n, 2) + · · ·+ S(n, n). Let
MaxS(n) denote the maximal element of the set {S(n, r) : r ∈ N+}. (3.1)
We know from Rennie and Dobson [15, page 121] that
log MaxS(n) = n log n− n log log n− n+O
(
n · log log n
log n
)
. (3.2)
Hence, MaxS(n) is quite large; see Tables (3.3)–(3.9) for some of its values; note
that those given in exponential form are only rounded values. These tables were
computed by Maple V. Release 5 (1997) under Windows 10.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
MaxS(n) 1 1 3 7 25 90 350 1 701 7 770 42 525 246 730 1 379 400
m(n) 1 1 3 3 21 21 175 175
m∗(n) 1 1 1 1 2 2
(3.3)
n 13 14 15 16 17
MaxS(n) 9 321 312 63 436 373 420 693 273 3 281 882 604 25 708 104 786
m(n) 2 250 2 250 31 500 31 500 595 350
m∗(n) 2 2 9 9 9
(3.4)
n 18 19 20
MaxS(n) 1 974 624 834 000 1 709 751 003 480 15 170 932 662 679
m(n) 595 350 13 216 770 13 216 770
m∗(n) 9 49 49
(3.5)
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n 21 22 23 24 25
m(n) 330 419 250 330 419 250 10 492 193 250 10 492 193 250 3.40 · 1011
m∗(n) 49 49 625 625 625
(3.6)
n 26 27 28 29 30 31
m(n) 3.40 · 1011 1.29 · 1013 1.29 · 1013 5.91 · 1014 5.91 · 1014 2.67 · 1016
m∗(n) 625 8100 8100 8100 8100 122500
(3.7)
n 32 33 34 35 36 37
m(n) 2.67 · 1016 1.38 · 1018 1.38 · 1018 8.44 · 1019 8.44 · 1019 5.08 · 1021
m∗(n) 122500 122500 122500 2893401 2893401 2893401
(3.8)
n 96 97 98 99 100
MaxS(n) 1.11 · 10109 3.22 · 10110 9.31 · 10111 2.69 · 10113 7.77 · 10114
m(n) 3.86 · 1084 1.08 · 1087 1.08 · 1087 3.09 · 1089 3.09 · 1089
m∗(n) 1.52 · 1032 1.52 · 1032 1.52 · 1032 1.45 · 1034 1.45 · 1034
(3.9)
The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem; (2.3) and (3.1) are still
in effect.
Theorem 3.1. Let n ≥ 5 be an integer, let k := b(n− 1)/2c, and let
m = m(n) := MaxS(k) ·MaxS(k − 1). (3.10)
Then Part(n)m or, equivalently, Equ(n)m is four-generated. In other words, the
m-th direct power of the lattice of all partitions of the set {1, 2, . . . , n} is generated
by a four-element subset.
Before proving this theorem, we formulate some remarks and corollaries and we
make some comments.
Corollary 3.2. Let n and m as in Theorem 3.1. Then for every integer t with
1 ≤ t ≤ m, the direct power Part(n)t is four-generated. In particular, Part(n) in
itself is four-generated.
The second half of Corollary 3.2 shows that Theorem 3.1 is a stronger statement
than the Strietz–Za´dori result; see (1.1) in the Introduction. This corollary follows
quite easily from Theorem 3.1 as follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Since the natural projection Part(n)m → Part(n)t, defined
by 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 7→ 〈x1, . . . , xt〉, sends a 4-element generating set into an at most
4-element generating set, Theorem 3.1 applies. 
Remark 3.3. We cannot say that m = m(n) in Theorem 3.1 is the largest possible
exponent. First, because the proof that we are going to present relies on a particular
construction and we do not know whether there exist better constructions for this
purpose. Second, because we use the Stirling numbers of the second kind to give a
lower estimate of the size of a maximum-sized antichain in partition lattices, and
we know from Canfield [2] that this estimate is not sharp. However, this fact would
not lead to a reasonably esthetic improvement of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.4. If n and t are positive integers such that n ≥ 4 and
t > Bell(n) · Bell(n− 1) · Bell(n− 2) · Bell(n− 3), (3.11)
then Part(n)t is not four-generated. Thus, the exponent in Theorem 3.1 cannot be
arbitrarily large.
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The product occurring in (3.11) is much larger than m(n) in (3.10). Hence,
there is a wide interval of integers t such that we do not know whether Part(n)t is
four-generated or not.
Proof of Remark 3.4. Let p denote the product in (3.11). For the sake of contra-
diction, suppose that t > p but Part(n)t is generated by some {α, β, γ, δ}. Here
α = 〈α1, α2, . . . , αt〉 with all the αi ∈ Part(n), and similarly for β, γ, and δ. By
the easy argument proving Corollary 3.2, we know that {αi, βi, γi, δi} generates
Part(n) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Since Part(n) is not 3-generated by Za´dori [19], the
quadruple 〈αi, βi, γi, δi〉 consists of pairwise distinct components. But there are
only p such quadruples, whereby the the pigeonhole principle yields two distinct
subscripts i and j ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that 〈αi, βi, γi, δi〉 = 〈αj , βj , γj , δj〉. Hence,
for every quaternary lattice term f , we have that f(αi, βi, γi, δi) = f(αj , βj , γj , δj).
This implies that for every η = 〈η1, . . . , ηt〉 ∈ [α, β, γ, δ]lat, we have that ηi = ηj .
Thus, [α, β, γ, δ]lat 6= Part(n)t, which is a contradiction proving Remark 3.4. 
Remark 3.5. For a four-generated finite lattice L, the direct square L2 of L need
not be four-generated. For example, if L is the distributive lattice generated freely
by four elements, then there exists no t ≥ 2 such that L2 is four-generated.
Proof. Let t ≥ 2, and let L be the free distributive lattice on four generators.
Observe that Lt is distributive. So if Lt was four-generated, then it would be a
homomorphic image of L and |L|t = |Lt| ≤ |L| would be a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since the notation of the elements of the base set is irrele-
vant, it suffices to show that Equ(Z(n))m is four-generated. No matter if n is odd
or even, we use the notation k, ai and bj as in Figures 2 and 3. We are going to de-
fine α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉, β = 〈β1, . . . , βm〉, γ = 〈γ1, . . . , γm〉, and δ] = 〈δ]1, . . . , δ]m〉
so that {α, β, γ, δ]} generates Equ(Z(n))m. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, αi, βi and
γi are defined as in Figures 2 and 3, that is, as in the proofs of Lemmas 2.1 and
2.3. However, the definition of the equivalences δ]i is going to be more tricky. Let
δi := [[a0, b0 ]]
e + [[ak, bk−1 ]]e, as in Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3. Note that none of αi, βi, γi,
and δi depends on i. We know from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3 that {αi, βi, γi, δi} gener-
ates Equ(Z(n)). Therefore, for any two distinct elements u and v of Z(n), we can
pick a quaternary lattice term fu,v = fu,v(α, β, γ, δ) with variables µ := 〈α, β, γ, δ〉
such that, in virtue of (2.21) and (2.28),
depending on the parity of n, fu,v is eu,v from the proof
of Lemma 2.1 or it is f∗u,v from that of Lemma 2.3, and
fu,v(αi, βi, γi, δi) = [[u, v ]]
e ∈ Equ(Z(n)).
 (3.12)
By defining fu,u to be the meet of its four variables, the validity of(3.12) extends
to the case u = v, where [[u, u]]e is understood as the least partition with all of its
blocks being singletons.
Next, let U := {a1, a2 . . . , ak−1} and W := {b0, b1, . . . , bk−1}; these sets are
indicated by dashed ovals in Figures 2, 3, and 4. By the definition of MaxS(k− 1),
we can pick an integer r′ ∈ N+ such that there are exactly MaxS(k−1) equivalences
of U with exactly r′ blocks. (By a block of an equivalence we mean a block of the
corresponding partition.) Let G denote the set of these “r′-block equivalences” of
U . Clearly, G is an antichain in Equ(U) with size |G| = MaxS(k − 1). Similarly,
MaxS(k) is the number of r′′-block equivalences for some r′′ ∈ N+ and the r′′-
block equivalences of W form an antichain H ⊆ Equ(W ) such that |H| = MaxS(k).
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Observe that, in the direct product Equ(U)× Equ(W ),
G ×H is an antichain. (3.13)
Since |G×H| = |G|·|H| = MaxS(k−1)·MaxS(k) = m, see (3.10), we can enumerate
G ×H in the following repetition-free list of length m as follows:
G ×H = {〈κ1, λ1〉, 〈κ2, λ2〉, . . . , 〈κm, λm〉}. (3.14)
For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we define δ]i as follows:
δ]i := the equivalence generated by δi ∪ κi ∪ λi; (3.15)
this makes sense since each of δi, κi and λi is a subset of Z(n)×Z(n). Clearly, for
any x 6= y ∈ Z(n), 〈x, y〉 ∈ αδ]i if and only 〈x, y〉 ∈ κi ∪ λi ⊆ U2 ∪W 2. This fact
together with κi ∩ λi ⊆ U2 ∩W 2 = ∅ yield that for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
if i 6= j, then αδ]i and αδ]j are incomparable. (3.16)
Figure 4. “zigzagged circles”
Next, we define
the “zigzagged circle” 〈d0, d1, . . . , dn−1〉 (3.17)
as follows; see also the thick edges and curves in Figure 4. (Note that the earlier
meaning of the notation d0, d1, . . . is no longer valid.) For i ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}, we let
d2i := ai and d2i+1 = bi. We let d2k = ak and, if n = 2k + 2 is even, then we let
dn−1 = c. Two consecutive vertices of the zigzagged circle will always be denoted
by dp and dp+1 where p, p + 1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and the addition is understood
modulo n. The zigzagged circle has one or two thick curved edges; they are 〈a0, ak〉
for n = 2k + 1 odd and they are 〈a0, c〉 and 〈c, ak〉 for n = 2k + 2 even; the rest of
its edges are straight thick edges. So the zigzagged circle consist of the thick edges,
whereby the adjective “thick” will often be dropped.
Next, we define some lattice terms associated with the edges of the zigzagged
circle. Namely, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1}, we define the
quaternary term
g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(µ) := fdp,dp+1(µ) ·
∏
〈dp,x〉∈αδ]j
(
αδ + fx,dp+1(µ)
)
·
∏
〈y,dp+1〉∈αδ]j
(
fdp,y(µ) + αδ
)
.
(3.18)
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The assumption on p means that (3.18) defines g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(µ) for each straight edge of
the zigzagged circle. We claim that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k−1},
g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(αj , βj , γj , δ
]
j) = [[dp, dp+1 ]]
e. (3.19)
In order to show (3.19), observe that βiδ
]
i = βiδi = [[a0, b0 ]]
e and γiδ
]
i = γiδi =
[[ak, bk−1 ]]e. These equalities, (2.22), (2.29), and (3.12) yield that for any u, v ∈
Z(n), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1},
fu,v(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) = [[u, v ]]
e and, in particular, (3.20)
fdp,dp+1(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) = [[dp, dp+1 ]]
e. (3.21)
Combining (3.18) and (3.21), we obtain the “≤” part of (3.19). In order to turn
this inequality to an equality, we have to show that the pair 〈dp, dp+1〉 belongs
to αδ]j + fx,dp+1(αj , βj , γj , δ
]
j) for every 〈dp, x〉 ∈ αδ]j , and it also belongs to
fdp,y(αj , βj , γj , δ
]
j) + αδ
]
j for every 〈y, dp+1〉 ∈ αδ]j . But this is trivial since
〈x, dp+1〉 ∈ fx,dp+1(αj , βj , γj , δ]j) in the first case by (3.20), and similarly trivial in
the second case. We have shown (3.19).
Next, we claim that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
if i 6= j, then there exists a p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1}
such that g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) = ∆ := 0Equ(Z(n)).
}
(3.22)
In order to prove (3.22), assume that i 6= j. For an equivalence γ ∈ Equ(Z(n)) and
x ∈ Z(n), the γ-block {y ∈ Z(n) : 〈x, y〉 ∈ γ} of x will be denoted by x/γ. We
know from (3.16) that αδ]j 6≤ αδ]i. Hence, there is an element x ∈ Z(n) such that
x/(αδ]j) 6⊆ x/(αδ]i). Since c/(αδ]j) = {c} = c/(αδ]i) for n even, x is distinct from
c. Hence, x is one of the endpoints of a straight edge 〈dp, dp+1〉 of the zigzagged
circle. This is how we can select a p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1}, that is, a straight edge
〈dp, dp+1〉 of the zigzagged circle (3.17) such that
dp/(αδ
]
j) 6⊆ dp/(αδ]i) or dp+1/(αδ]j) 6⊆ dp+1/(αδ]i). (3.23)
Now, we are going to show that this p satisfies the requirement of (3.22). We
can assume that the first part of the disjunction given in (3.23) holds, because the
treatment for the second half is very similar. Pick an element
z ∈ dp/(αδ]j) such that z /∈ dp/(αδ]i). (3.24)
Because of (3.21) and the first meetand in (3.18),
g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) ≤ [[dp, dp+1 ]]e. (3.25)
We claim that
〈dp, dp+1〉 /∈ g(j)dp,dp+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i). (3.26)
Suppose the contrary. Then, using (3.18) and 〈dp, z〉 ∈ αδ]j , we have that
〈dp, dp+1〉 ∈ αδ]i + fz,dp+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i)
(3.20)
= αδ]i + [[z, dp+1 ]]
e. (3.27)
According to (3.27), there exists a shortest sequence u0 = dp+1, u1, . . . , uq−1,
uq = dp such that for every ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} either 〈u`, u`+1〉 ∈ αδ]i, which is
called a horizontal step, or 〈u`, u`+1〉 ∈ [[z, dp+1 ]]e, which is a non-horizontal step.
There is at least one non-horizontal steps since dp and dp+1 are in distinct α-blocks.
A non-horizontal step means that {u`, u`+1} = {z, dp+1}, so {z, dp+1} is the only
“passageway” between the two nonsingleton α-blocks. Hence, there exists exactly
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one non-horizontal step since our sequence is repetition-free. Clearly, this step is
the first step. Hence, u1 = z and all the subsequent steps are horizontal steps.
Hence, 〈z, dp〉 = 〈u1, dp〉 ∈ αδ]i. Thus, z ∈ dp/(αδ]i), contradicting the choice of
z in (3.24). This contradiction yields (3.26). Finally, (3.26) together with (3.25)
imply (3.22).
Next, for j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} and q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 2}, we define the following
quaternary term
h
(j)
dq,dq+1
(µ) :=
fdq,dq+1(µ) ·
2k−1∏
p=0
(
fdq,dp(µ) + g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(µ) + fdp+1,dq+1(µ)
)
·
2k−1∏
p=0
(
fdq,dp+1(µ) + g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(µ) + fdp,dq+1(µ)
)
.

(3.28)
We claim that, for q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
h
(j)
dq,dq+1
(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) =
{
[[dq, dq+1 ]]
e, if i = j,
∆ = 0Equ(Z(n)), if i 6= j,
(3.29)
where q+1 in subscript position is understood modulo n. In virtue of (3.19), (3.20),
and (3.21), the validity of (3.29) is clear when i = j. So, to prove (3.29), we can
assume that i 6= j. Since h(j)dq,dq+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i) ≤ [[dq, dq+1 ]]e by (3.20) and (3.21),
it suffices to show that 〈dq, dq+1〉 /∈ h(j)dq,dq+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i). Suppose the contrary.
Then we obtain from (3.20) and (3.28) that for all p ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1},
〈dq, dq+1〉 ∈ [[dq, dp ]]e + g(j)dp,dp+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i) + [[dp+1, dq+1 ]]e and (3.30)
〈dq, dq+1〉 ∈ [[dq, dp+1 ]]e + g(j)dp,dp+1(αi, βi, γi, δ]i) + [[dp, dq+1 ]]e. (3.31)
Now we choose p according to (3.22); then g
(j)
dp,dp+1
(αi, βi, γi, δ
]
i) can be omitted
from (3.30) and (3.31). Therefore, if p = q, then both (3.30) and (3.31) assert that
〈dq, dq+1〉 ∈ ∆, a contradiction. If |{dp, dp+1, dq, dq+1}| = 4, then both (3.30) and
(3.31) give a contradiction again. If |{dp, dp+1, dq, dq+1}| = 3, then exactly one of
(3.30) and (3.31) gives a contradiction. Hence, no matter how p and q are related,
we obtain a contradiction. This proves the i 6= j part of (3.29). Thus, (3.29) has
been proved.
Finally, let K := [α, β, γ, δ]]lat; it is a sublattice of Equ(Z(n))
m and we are going
to show that K = Equ(Z(n))m. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By (3.29),
〈∆, . . . ,∆, [[dq, dq+1 ]]e︸ ︷︷ ︸
j-th entry
,∆, . . . ,∆〉 ∈ K, for all q ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. (3.32)
Since the sublattice
Sj := {∆} × {∆} × Equ(Z(n))× {∆} × {∆}
with the non-singleton factor at the j-the place is isomorphic to Z(n), it follows
from (3.32) and Lemma 2.2 that Sj ⊆ K, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Therefore, since
every element of Equ(Z(n))m is of the form s(1)∨s(2)∨· · ·∨s(m) with s(1) ∈ S1, . . . ,
s(m) ∈ Sm, we obtain that Equ(Z(n))m ⊆ K. Consequently, Equ(Z(n))m = K =
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[α, β, γ, δ]]lat is a four-generated lattice, as required. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is
complete. 
4. (1 + 1 + 2)-generation
By a (1 + 1 + 2)-generating set or, in other words, a generating subset of order
type 1 + 1 + 2 we mean a four element generating set such that exactly two of
the four elements are comparable. Lattices having such a generating set are called
(1 + 1 + 2)-generated. In his paper, Za´dori [19] proved that for every integer n ≥ 7,
the partition lattice Part(n) is (1 + 1 + 2)-generated. In this way, he improved the
result proved by Strietz [17] from {n : n ≥ 10} to {n : n ≥ 7}. In this section, we
generalize this result to direct powers by the following theorem; (2.3) and (3.1) are
still in effect.
Theorem 4.1. Let n ≥ 7 be an integer, let k := b(n− 1)/2c, and let
m∗ = m∗(n) := max
( b(k − 1)/2c, 1, MaxS(b(k − 1)/2c)2 ) . (4.1)
Then Part(n)m∗ or, equivalently, Equ(n)m∗ is (1+1+2)-generated. In other words,
the m∗-th direct power of the lattice of all partitions of the set {1, 2, . . . , n} is has
a generating subset of order type 1 + 1 + 2.
Figure 5. Z(2k + 2) for k = 23
Proof. Combining Za´dori’s 1986 idea, see [19] with that of the proof or Theorem 3.1,
the proof is straightforward and, thus, would be boring to the reader. Hence, and
also because of saving space, we only outline the proof. With our earlier conventions,
we define α, β, and γ as in Section 3, but we let δ := [[a0, ak ]]
e + [[b0, bk−1 ]]e. For
n = 47, this is illustrated by Figure 5 if we omit vertex c. For n = 48, Figure 5 is a
faithful illustration without omitting anything but taking (2.5) into account. Since
[[a0, b0 ]]
e = β(γ + δ) and [[ak, bk−1 ]]e = γ(β + δ), (4.2)
we obtain that [α, β, γ, δ]lat = Equ(()Z(n)) both for n odd and n even in the
same way as in Section 3. (For n odd, also in the same way as Za´dori [19].)
Instead of taking the same U and W as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, now we let
U := {ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i is odd} and W := {bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 and i is odd}.
The point with this U and W is that we are going to extend δ by equivalences of U
and W as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 but we want to keep the validity of (4.2). For
(4.2), it was important that the distance k between a0 and ak and the distance k−1
between b0 and bk−1 are of distinct parities. Since the distance between any two
elements of U is even, the same holds for W , and since (U ∪W )×{a0, b0, ak, bk−1}
will remain disjoint from the extended δ, the validity of (4.2) will not be in danger.
The rest of the proof is practically the same as in case of Theorem 3.1, but there
is a little modification for n small. Namely, if t := b(k − 1)/2c = 2, then Equ(t) is
a chain and MaxS(t)2 = 1. However, we can easily take a 2-element antichain in
Equ(2)× Equ(2) in this case. 
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Next, we state a counterpart of Corollary 3.2, which clearly holds.
Corollary 4.2. Let n and m∗ as in Theorem 4.1. Then for every integer t with
1 ≤ t ≤ m∗, the direct power Part(n)t is (1 + 1 + 2)-generated.
5. Authentication and secret key cryptography with lattices
While lattice theory is rich with involved constructs and proofs, it seems not to
have many, if any, applications in information theory. The purpose of this section
is to suggest a protocol primarily for authentication; it is also good for secret key
cryptography, and it could be appropriate for a commitment protocol.
Assume that during the authentication protocol that we are going to outline,
Andra´s1 intends to prove his identity to a Bank and conversely; online, of course.
We need a lattice L with the following properties:
• |L| is large,
• L has a complicated structure,
• the length of L is small (that is, all maximal chains of L are small),
• every non-zero element of L has lots of lover covers and dually,
• L can be given by and constructed easily from little data,
• and L is generated by few elements.
The first four properties are to make the Adversary’s task difficult (and practically
impossible) while the rest of these properties ensure that Andra´s and the Bank
can handle L. It is not necessary that L has anything to do with partitions, but
partitions lattices and their direct powers seem to be good choices. Partition lattices
are quite complicated since every finite lattice can be embedded into a finite lattice
by Pudla´k and Tu˚ma [14]. Also, they are large lattices described by very little
data. For example, we can take
L = Part(201), its size is |Part(201)| = 3.18 · 10277, (5.1)
or L = Part(10)55, its size is |Part(10)55| = 3.47 · 10278. (5.2)
Although these two lattices seem to be similar is several aspects, let us point out
a possible advantage of Part(10)55: while it is time-consuming to compute the join
of two partitions in Part(201) and parallel computation seems not to help much,
joins can easily be computed componentwise in
Part(10)55 if parallel computation is allowed.
(5.3)
Andra´s and the Bank chooses two small integer parameters p, q ≥ 4, the suggested
value is p = q = 8 or larger; this can be public. Also, Andra´s and the Bank agrees
upon a p-tuple s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sp〉 ∈ Lp. This ~s is the common authentication code
for Andra´s and the Bank; only they know it and they keep it in secret. So far, the
role of s is that of the PIN (personal identification number) of a bank card.
Every time Andra´s and the Bank begins to communicate, Andra´s selects a ran-
dom vector w = 〈w1, w2, . . . , wq〉 of long and complicated p-ary lattice terms. (If
the Bank thinks that w is not complicated enough, then it can insist of choosing
another w or there can be a software that automatically filters out those w that are
not complex enough.) After that Andra´s sends his w to the Bank, the Bank sends
w(s) := 〈w1(s1, . . . , sp), . . . , wq(s1, . . . , sp)〉
1Andra´s is the Hungarian version of Andrew; as a famous lattice theorist with this first name,
I mention my scientific advisor, Andra´s P. Huhn (1947–1985).
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back to Andra´s. Andra´s also computes w(s) and compares it with what the Bank
has sent; if they are equal then Andra´s can be sure that he communicates with
the Bank rather then with an Adversary. Note that it is easy and fast to compute
w(s) from w and s. The Bank verifies similarly if it is communicating with Andra´s.
That is, the Bank sends a randomly chosen complicated and long q-tuple w′ of
p-ary lattice terms to Andra´s and checks if Andra´s can send w′(s).
At each occasion, new w and w′ are chosen randomly, so even if the Adversary
intercepts the communication, he cannot use the old values of w(s) and w′(s). So
the Adversary’s only chance to interfere is to extract the secret s from r := w(s)
and w (or from w′(s) and w′). However, extracting s from r = w(s) and w seems
to be hard. (This problem is in NP and hopefully it is not in P .)
The Adversary cannot test all possible p-tuples s′ ∈ Lp since there are astronom-
ically many such tuples. The usual iteration technique that would work to find the
root of a function Rp → R is not applicable since it is very unlikely that two ele-
ments of L are comparable, simply because the length of L is small. It is even more
unlikely that two members of Lq are comparable. If the adversary begins parsing,
say, r1 = w1(s), then even the first step splits into several directions since r1 ∈ L
has many lover and upper covers and so there are many ways to represent it as the
join of two elements (in case the outmost operation in w1 is a join) or the meet
of two elements (in case the outmost operation is a meet). Each of these several
directions splits into several sub-directions at the next step, and this happens many
times depending on the length of w1. But w1 is a long term, whence exponentially
many sub-directions should be followed, which is not feasible.
Some caution by Andra´s and the Bank is necessary when choosing the secret
common authentication code s. This s should be chosen so that [s1, s2, . . . , sp]lat =
L or at least [s1, s2, . . . , sp]lat should be very large. One possibility to ensure that
s1, s2, . . . , sp generates L is to extend a four-element generating set form Sections 2–
4 to a p-element subset of L. If L = Part(201), then one can pick a permutation τ of
the set {1, 2, . . . , n}; this τ induces an automorphism τ of Part(201) in the natural
way, and {τ(α), τ(β), τ(γ), τ(δ)} with α, . . . , δ from Section 2 is a four-element
generating set of Part(201). If L = Part(10)55, then in addition to a permutation
of {1, 2, . . . , 10}, there are many ways to select a 55-element antichain as a subset
of the 175-element maximum-sized antichain that occurs in (3.13). In both cases,
Andra´s and the Bank can easily pick one of the astronomically many four-element
generating sets described in the present paper. They can extend this four-element
set to a p-element one in many ways, and there are four-element generating sets
described neither in the present paper, nor in Strietz [17].
Andra´s and the Bank should also be careful when selecting a q-tuple w =
〈w1, . . . , wq〉 of complicated p-ary lattice terms. To exemplify our ideas, consider
the (short) lattice term
x4
(
x5 +
((
(x1x8 + x2x3)(˙x4x5 + x3x6)
)
+
(
x2x8 + (x3x4)x7
)))
. (5.4)
Now, to choose a random term w1, we can begin with a randomly chosen variable.
Then, we iterate the following, say, 300 times: after picking an occurrence of a
variable in the already constructed term randomly (we denote this occurrence by
xi), selecting two of the p variables, and picking one of the two operations symbols,
we replace xi by the meet or the join of the two variables selected, depending on
which operations symbol has been picked. However, the following questions arise.
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Shall we pick the first occurrence of x4, the first occurrence of x5 and the (only)
occurrence of x6 in (5.4) with the same probability or should these probabilities
depend (and how should they depend) on the “depths” of these occurrences, which
are distinct? Should we always check whether the replacement immediately cancels
be the absorption laws? For example, if x6 in (5.4) is replaced by x3 +x7, then this
replacement cancels, but it is easy to avoid such replacements. If q = p, which is
recommended, then it is desirable that w(s) should be far from s and, in addition,
each of the w1(s), . . . , wq(s) should be far from each other, from 0 = 0L, 1, and
from s1, . . . , sp. By “far”, we mean that the usual graph theoretical distance in
the Hasse diagram of L or that of Lq is larger than a constant; it is a question what
this constant should be for L or for Lq. Since L is of a small length, there is a
danger that while we are building, say, w1, then w1(s) becomes 0 or 1 quite early.
Hence, while developing w1 randomly, one can monitor w1(s) and interfere into the
random process from time to time.
If L is from (5.1) or (5.2), then L is a semimodular lattice, so any two maximal
chain of L consist of the same number of elements. In this case, the above-mentioned
distance of x, y ∈ L can be computed quite easily; see for example Cze´dli, Powers,
and White [9, equation (1.8)]. Namely, the distance of x and y is
distance(x, y) = length([x, x+ y]) + length([y, x+ y]). (5.5)
Since any two maximal chains of Equ(n) are of the same size, it follows easily that
length([x, x + y]) is the difference of the number of x-blocks and the number of
(x+ y)-blocks, and similarly for length([x, x+ y]).
Several questions about the strategy remains open but future experiments with
computer programs can lead to satisfactorily answers. However, even after obtain-
ing good answers, the reliability of the above-described protocol would still remain
the question of belief in some extent. This is not unexpected, since many modern
cryptographic and similar protocols rely on the belief that certain problems, like
factoring an integer or computing discrete logarithms, are hard.
If authentication is not (or no longer) targeted and only w is transmitted, then
w(s) described above is known only for Andra´s and the Bank. In the same way, they
can easily convert w(s) into a string or a sequence of integers. Hence, Andra´s and
the Bank can use w(s) as the secret key of a classical cryptosystem like Vernam’s.
Such a key cannot be used repeatedly many times but Andra´s and the Bank can
select a new w and can get a new key w(s) as often as they wish.
We guess that Andra´s can lock a commitment s by making w(s) public. To
be more precise, the protocol is that there is a Verifier who chooses w, and then
Andra´s computes r = w(s) with the Verifier’s w and makes this r public. From
that moment, Andra´s cannot change his commitment s, nobody knows what this s
is, but armed with w and r, everybody can check Andra´s when he reveals s.
n 4 5 6 7 8 9
|Part(n)| 15 52 203 877 4 140 21 147
|∀8-sets| 6435 7.53 · 108 6.22 · 1013 8.41 · 1018 2.13 · 1024 9.91 · 1029
|tested| 100 000 10 000 10 000 6000 1000 284
|found| 89 780 7 690 7913 5044 848 248
% 89.78 76.90 79.13 84.01 84.80 90.19
(5.6)
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Finally, we have developed and used a computer program to see if there are
sufficiently many 8-element generating subsets and n-element generating sets of
Part(n). This program, written in Bloodshed Dev-Pascal v1.9.2 (Freepascal) under
Windows 10 and partially in Maple V. Release 5 (1997), is available from the
author’s website; see the list of publications there. The results obtained with the
help of this program are reported in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The second, third, fourth,
fifth, and sixth rows in Tables 5.6 give the size of Part(n), the number of its 8-
element subsets, the number of randomly selected 8-elements subsets, the number
of those selects 8-elements subsets that generate Part(n), and the percentage of
these generating 8-element subsets with respect to the number of the selected 8-
element subsets, respectively. These subsets were selected independently according
to the uniform distribution; a subset could be selected more than once. Table 5.7
is practically the same but the n-element subsets generating Part(n) are counted
in it.
n 4 5 6 7 8 9
|Part(n)| 15 52 203 877 4 140 21 147
|∀n-sets| 1365 2 598 960 9.2 · 1010 7.73 · 1016 2.13 · 1024 2.33 · 1033
|tested| 100 000 10 000 10 000 10000 1000
|found| 89 780 1430 3918 6811 848
% 89.78 14.30 39.18 68.11 84.80
(5.7)
Computing the last column of Table 5.6 took 73 hours for a desktop computer
with AMD Ryzen 7 2700X Eight-Core Processor 3.70 GHz; this explains that no
more 8-element subsets have been tested for Table 5.6 and the last column of
Table 5.7 is missing. After computing the columns for n = 4 and n = 5 in Tables 5.6
and 5.7, we expected that the number in the percentage row (the last row) would
decrease as n would decrease as n grows. To our surprise, the opposite happened.
Based on these two tables, we guess that p = n should be and even p = 8 could be
appropriate in the protocol if n = 201 and L is taken from (5.1).
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